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Background: The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) investigated the
17 April 2013 explosion at the West Fertilizer Company (WFC) that resulted in 15 fatalities, more
than 260 injuries, and damage to more than 150 buildings. Among these structures were four
nearby school buildings cumulatively housing children in grades kindergarten–12, a nursing care
facility, and an apartment complex. The incident occurred during the evening when school was not
in session, which reduced the number of injuries.
Objectives: The goal of this commentary is to illustrate the consequences of siting schools near
facilities that store or use hazardous chemicals, and highlight the need for additional regulations to
prevent future siting of schools near these facilities.
Discussion: We summarize the findings of the CSB’s investigation related to the damaged school
buildings and the lack of regulation surrounding the siting of schools near facilities that store
hazardous chemicals.
Conclusions: In light of the current lack of federal authority for oversight of land use near educational institutions, state and local governments should take a proactive role in promulgating state
regulations that prohibit the siting of public receptors, such as buildings occupied by children, near
facilities that store hazardous chemicals.
Citation: Tinney VA, Denton JM, Sciallo-Tyler L, Paulson JA. 2016. School siting near industrial
chemical facilities: findings from the U.S. Chemical Safety Board’s investigation of the West
Fertilizer Explosion. Environ Health Perspect 124:1493–1496; http://dx.doi.org/10.1289/EHP132

Introduction
On 17 April 2013, an explosion that
occurred at the West Fertilizer Company
(WFC) in West, Texas, resulted in the death
of 15 persons and hundreds of injuries.
The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard
Investigation Board (CSB), an independent
U.S. federal agency charged with investigating industrial chemical accidents and
issuing recommendations aimed at preventing
and mitigating their recurrence, conducted a
detailed review of the devastating explosion.
The CSB’s final investigation report, released
in January 2016, illustrates the severe public
health impacts of chemical incidents when
they occur at fixed facilities that neighbor
residential communities (CSB 2016).
The explosion occurred at 1951 hours,
only 20 minutes after the WFC fire was
observed and reported to the fire department.
The explosion of fertilizer-grade ammonium
nitrate (FGAN)—with an explosive energy
equivalent to cause the damage of 12.5 tons
of TNT (2,4,6-trinitrotoluene)—fatally
injured 12 emergency responders and three
members of the community, and caused
> 260 people to seek treatment for injuries.
More than 150 offsite buildings were rendered
uninhabitable following the incident. Among
these structures were those of the nearby West
Intermediate School and the West High
School, located approximately 550 and 1,150
feet away, respectively, as shown in Figure 1.
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The siting of schools near facilities that store
or produce hazardous chemicals is not unique
to West, Texas. In the state of Texas alone, the
CSB found that 19 (47.5%) of the 40 facilities storing FGAN are located within 0.5 miles
of an elementary school, secondary school, or
high school. One school identified was only
0.12 mile from a FGAN facility, which is closer
than the schools damaged in West. The CSB
has identified a lack of safe land use planning
as a contributing factor to the severity of the
consequences in 13 of its prior investigations.
Fortunately, the incident occurred in
the evening, when school was not in session.
All other conditions unchanged, had the fire
and subsequent explosion occurred during
the school day or when an evening activity
or sporting event was taking place, it is likely
that the injuries and fatalities would have
been significantly greater, especially given the
short time (20 minutes) that elapsed between
the fire and the explosion. The total that
could have been exposed at all four schools,
assuming full attendance, was 1,486 students
and 191 staff members, with 665 students and
86 staff combined at the Intermediate School
and the High School, both of which sustained
the most damage.
Blast overpressure from the explosion, as
well as fires that began postexplosion, caused
damage to the West Elementary School, High
School, Middle School, and Intermediate
School. Damage surveys showed that debris
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accumulated in the hallways and ceilings
in several classrooms and the gymnasium
collapsed at the West Intermediate School,
as shown in Figure 2. Following the blast
wave, a fire also started at West Intermediate
School, which would have exposed students
and staff to heat and smoke. The ceiling, light
fixtures, and other debris were thrown onto
the desks of one classroom. Glazing hazards—
or evidence of flying glass fragments—were
found in the schools a significant distance
from broken windows. The CSB commissioned blast modeling experts to examine
structural damage and estimate overpressures
at varying locations in all directions from the
center of the explosion. External pressures
measured between 0.4 and 1 lb/in 2 (psi)
[2.76 kPa (kilopascals)] for the West High
School and 0.8 to 2.0 psi (5.52–13.79 kPa)
for the Intermediate School. Injuries such as
lacerations from glass and flying debris are
commonly associated with these overpressures.
The level of structural damage within the
schools ranged from light, repairable damage
and window glazing to large deformation
of structural components. The more severe
damage is usually associated with serious
injuries to occupants, and the CSB estimated that 10-40% of occupants would have
suffered fatal injuries (ABS Consulting 2015).
Any students and staff present would have
been covered in debris and would have had
to climb over the debris to reach the exit. Due
Address correspondence to V.A. Tinney, U.S.
Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board,
1750 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Suite 910, Washington,
DC 20006. Telephone: 202-261-7642. E‑mail:
veronica.tinney@csb.gov
The authors thank the CSB West Fertilizer
Investigation team: J. Banks, R. Shroff, B. Lashkari,
S. Oyewole, L. Tyler, and J. Denton. Thanks to
C. Barnett for her review.
Views expressed in this article are the authors’ and
are not necessarily the views of the U.S. Chemical
Safety Board (CSB).
The authors declare they have no actual or potential
competing financial interests.
Received: 18 March 2016; Revised: 2 June 2016;
Accepted: 1 July 2016; Published: 2 August 2016.
Note to readers with disabilities: EHP strives
to ensure that all journal content is accessible to all
readers. However, some figures and Supplemental
Material published in EHP articles may not conform to
508 standards due to the complexity of the information
being presented. If you need assistance accessing journal
content, please contact ehponline@niehs.nih.gov.
Our staff will work with you to assess and meet your
accessibility needs within 3 working days.

1493

Tinney et al.

to the extent of the damage, the Intermediate
and High Schools were demolished, with
much of the Middle School demolished as
well. The full details and consequences of
the incident can be found in the CSB’s final
investigation report (CSB 2016).
The tragedy at WFC caused many to
wonder why a community was located so
close to an FGAN storage facility. The WFC
began operations in 1962; as the City of
West developed over the years, it expanded
toward the facility without any state or local
zoning regulations to govern the separation
between WFC and community structures.
The schools closest to the WFC that sustained
the most damage—the Intermediate and the
High School—were built in 1985 and 2000,
respectively, after the fertilizer storage facility
began operation. Texas, like many states in the
United States, has no state regulations relating
to siting schools near hazardous facilities; as a
result, the school system was not prohibited
from siting its buildings near a facility that
stored hazardous chemicals.

information collected by EPA, the Center
for Effective Government has estimated that
19.6 million (36.6%) of 53.6 million children
attend schools located in the vulnerability
zone of fixed facilities that report to the RMP
(Frank and Moulton 2014).

Proximity to industrial facilities also
includes potential exposures to hazardous
chemicals accidental air releases. For example,
the CSB’s investigation of the 2012 fire at the
Chevron Refinery in Richmond, California,
found that exposure to the particulates
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Discussion
Several studies have attempted to quantify the
risk of exposure to students from chemical
incidents, as well as the frequency with which
chemical incidents injure children at school.
A study using the Hazardous Substances
Emergency Events Surveillance (HSEES)
system, coordinated by the Agency for Toxic
Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR)
found that between 1999 and 2008, 11%
(1,730) of the 15,506 persons injured from
chemical incidents were students exposed at
school (Duncan et al. 2015); however, this
analysis and other earlier analyses do not
distinguish students injured by incidents such
as school laboratory accidents, intentional acts,
and offsite consequences from those injured
by fixed industrial facilities (Wattigney et al.
2008). Data from the combined HSEES
annual reports between 2003 and 2009 noted
that of the events for which the ATSDR
was able to geocode, approximately 5,962 of
the reported 53,036 events occurred within
0.25 mile of a school (ATSDR 2004, 2005,
2006, 2007, 2009, 2010).
Analysis using information submitted to
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s
(EPA) Risk Management Program (RMP)
characterizes the risk imposed to students
from sources near educational institutions.
The RMP requires facilities with more than a
specified quantity of a specified substance to
report information to the U.S. EPA and implement a risk management program. Part of this
program includes a type of hazard analysis
called a vulnerability zone, which identifies
the geographic area and population that would
be affected should a hazardous substance
release occur (U.S. EPA 1987). Using RMP
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Figure 1. Map Showing Proximity of the WFC Facility to Schools and Other Public Structures (Source:
Image © 2009 Google Earth, DigitalGlobe, with additional information provided by Greater Waco Chamber).

Figure 2. Interior of Burned Northeast Section of West Intermediate School (Source: ABS Consulting 2015).
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resulting from the plume caused approximately 15,000 people to seek medical attention (CSB 2015). Legot et al. (2010) looked
at facilities with the highest releases of air
toxics, gathered from the U.S. EPA Toxics
Release Inventory data, for five chemicals
that are known developmental toxins (lead,
mercury, carbon disulfide, manganese, and
toluene) and found that 1,977 schools were
located within approximately a 2-mile radius
of 305 facilities, putting approximately
964,525 children at risk.
Currently no federal agency has the
authority to prohibit school siting near
hazardous facilities, or to consider potential
environmental hazards of the site or adjacent
site when siting schools. All states have
compulsory education laws, and the overwhelming majority of students attend school
outside the home. States typically delegate
authority for decision making to the local
education agency and for land use planning
to local municipalities (NASBE 2016). In
2006, Rhode Island Legal Services (RILS)
surveyed state laws, regulations, and policies
to determine which states had codes or regulations in place to manage the siting of schools
near hazardous facilities and other pollution
sources. RILS found that at the time of the
survey, 20 states had no policies that addressed
the siting of schools near environmental
hazards, including the assessment of potential
school sites and their proximity to environmental hazards (RILS 2006). Further, only
14 state policies prohibit the siting of schools
near hazards or pollution sources; the more
common policy is only to require the consideration of siting factors. For example, California
has established standards for selecting the
location of new schools, including prohibiting
the siting of schools near railroads, areas with
heavy traffic, aboveground water or fuel storage
tanks, aboveground or underground pipelines
that pose a safety hazard, or hazardous waste
disposal (California Department of Education
2015). In addition, California schools receiving
state funding must perform an environmental
assessment that considers the threat of a nearby
release of hazardous material (California
Education Code 1996). Though most of these
policies are in place under state education
codes and departments of education, environmental planners, educators, and public health
professionals all have a role in influencing
school siting policies and preventing school
siting near hazardous facilities (Cohen 2010).
Though there is no federal agency with
the authority to regulate school siting, the
U.S. EPA was authorized by Congress to
create voluntary school siting guidelines.
The resulting School Siting Guidelines (U.S.
EPA 2011) are the most robust that exist
for considering environmental exposures in
the siting of schools. Although these siting
Environmental Health Perspectives •
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guidelines are indeed comprehensive, they are
nonetheless voluntary. The guidelines are not
intended to apply to existing schools, and only
include the consideration of environmental
and siting factors for new uses or new schools.
Though the U.S. EPA’s guidelines focus
on exposure to environmental hazards and
health risks, such as exposure to air pollution,
they also cover physical hazards, such as fire
or explosion. As they relate to large industrial
facilities, the guidelines state that the screening
perimeter for identifying large industrial facilities of interest is 0.5 mile. The World Health
Organization (WHO), in their information
series on school health, recommends a distance
of 2 miles between schools and hazardous facilities (WHO 2003), which is consistent with
the CSB’s observations of significant community damage in the City of West up to 2 miles
away from the explosion epicenter. The potential safety hazards posed by these industrial
facilities include explosions or fire. With regard
to ameliorating these hazards, the guidelines
recommend emergency shelter design incorporated into the new schools and the use of
all-hazards emergency response plans. In terms
of identifying and evaluating all large industrial
facilities within a 0.5-mile radius, the guidelines state that the evaluation should include
consulting air quality agencies.
Based on the findings of the West investigation and the identification of similar
situations in Texas and the United States by
others, we suggest that additional guidance
include considering the physical properties,
such as explosive or flammability characteristics, of the materials stored at these identified industrial facilities. The use of setback
distances when considering the location of
new schools would also help reduce exposure
to physical hazards such as fire and explosion.
Actions to ensure awareness of chemical
hazards near school buildings and communities before initiating new development can be
taken by government agencies, community
members, local emergency response officials
and school officials. Schools should consult
with local emergency response officials, such
as local emergency planning committees or
state emergency response officials, to better
understand the characteristics of the chemicals
present at industrial facilities in their locale and
to be included in emergency response plans
and practice activities. Operators and owners
of facilities should likewise engage in communicating the hazards to neighboring communities, and the U.S. EPA has developed, in its
RMP program guidance, guidelines for facilities in providing data and information to the
public (U.S. EPA 2004). Public information
tools, such as geographic information systems,
are available through the the U.S. EPA’s
Risk-Screen Environmental Indicators (RSEI)
program (https://www.epa.gov/rsei) and
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Toxics Release Inventory program (https://
www.epa.gov/toxics-release-inventory-triprogram), which provide information and
data on the location of facilities with hazardous
chemicals required to report to the U.S.
EPA under the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA)
(2011), as well as information on the risks
associated with the chemicals in use at each
facility. Armed with greater awareness and
knowledge of hazards, local governments and
land use planners can then make informed
decisions and use a variety of regulatory tools
to mitigate the potential offsite impacts of
hazards at industrial facilities. This includes
the use of protective zoning, which can restrict
development in hazardous areas (Schwab
2010). Regulatory tools that have been used
to manage land use hazards near transmission
pipelines, which may be translated for use near
chemical facilities, include low-density zoning
requirements near facilities; the use of fire resistance in the building codes for public buildings; deed restrictions on development; and the
use of setback distances near chemical facilities
(Osland 2013).

Conclusion
The CSB’s investigation of the WFC explosion highlights the devastation that can occur
when schools and communities are located
near facilities storing hazardous chemicals. In
light of the current lack of federal authority
for oversight of land use near educational institutions, states should take a proactive role in
promulgating state regulations that prohibit
the siting of schools near facilities that store
hazardous chemicals. The CSB is in the process
of undertaking researching issues concerning
land use planning near industrial facilities.
Such research will focus on documenting
the extent of the problem and assessing the
adequacy of existing regulations and policies
related to land-use planning near chemical
facilities. The safety of our communities is a
shared responsibility and the CSB hopes that
other federal agencies, and state and local
authorities with FGAN in their jurisdictions,
will learn from the lessons of the WFC investigation and partner with the CSB on outreach
and advocacy activities to ensure that the places
where our children learn are not vulnerable to
the consequences of chemical accidents.
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